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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by Order of the Utah Supreme Court
dated May 13th, 2003 and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2001) and § 78-22(4) (1986).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether, given all the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom, taken in a light
most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, Plaintiffs/Appellant's Complaint is sufficient
as a matter of law to maintain a civil action against Defendants/Appellees for
intentionally interfering with Plaintiffs/Appellant's prospective economic relations and
therefore the trial court erred in granting Defendants/Appellees Motion to dismiss? A
copy of the Order granting the Defendants/Appellees Motion to Dismiss is included in the
Addendum. (R. at 113-114).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted shall be treated as one for summary judgment Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine
issue of material fact, the court views the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the losing party and in deciding whether the trial court
1

properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the prevailing party, the court gives no
deference to the trial court's view of the law; it is reviewed for correctness. Ron Case
Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). At
issue is the correctness of the lower court's decision to grant the Defendants/Appellee's
motion for dismissal, applying a de novo review in which no deference is granted to the
trial court's ruling.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 8(a)(1), 12(b)(6), 56(c)
Utah Code Annotated § 58-l-501(2)(b), § 58-l-501(2)(h), § 58-67-501(l)(c)(i), § 58-67502, § 78-2-2(3)0, § 78-2-2(4), § 78-27-42 (1986).

NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ORDER OF THE
LOWER COURT APPEALED FROM
This case involved an action for intentional interference with prospective
economic relations by the Plaintiff/Appellant Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. against the
Defendants/Appellees Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert Peterson, M.D.
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman had been dismissed from the action on pursuant to a
settlement agreement and subsequent Order of Dismissal With Prejudice filed with the
district court on October 23rd, 2002. (R. at 91-92). The action was therefore against
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Robert Peterson. This appeal is from an Order dated December
2

5 , 2002 by the Honorable Judge Stephen L. Henroid, Third District Court, State of Utah,
Salt Lake County, granting the Defendant/Appellee Dr. Robert Peterson's Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. (R. at 113). A timely Notice of Appeal was filed on
December 26th, 2002 and on December 30th, 2002 the Utah Court of Appeals transferred
the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). (R. at
103-106). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal back to the Utah Court of
Appeals on May 13th, 2003 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). Mediation was
unsuccessful and on January 13 , 2004 the Utah Court of Appeals issued a letter setting
the briefing schedule. Defendant/Appellee Peterson filed a Motion to Strike Appellant's
Brief on April 15th, 2004. On May 5th, 2004 the Honorable William A. Thome Jr.
ordered that Defendant/Appellee Peterson's Motion to Strike Appellant's Brief be granted
and further ordered that the Plaintiff/Appellant could file a compliant brief within thirty
days of the Order. (See Addendum 1).

STATEMENT FACTS
The Defendants/Appellees are both licensed physicians specializing in the
practice of neurosurgery. (R. at 64). Both Defendants/Appellees maintain active staff
privileges at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. at 64). The
Defendants/Appellees are also partners acting under the business name Neurosurgical
Associates, L.L.C. (R. at 64). Defendant/Appellee Dr. Mark Reichman is the Chief of
the Neurosurgery Division at LDS Hospital. (R. at 64).
The Plaintiff/Appellant is a licensed physician specializing in orthopedic
3

surgery and who also maintains active staff privileges at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City,
Utah. (R. at 64). In the normal course of their respective businesses, the
Defendants/Appellees and the Plaintiff/Appellant are competitors for certain types of
surgical patients seeking treatment for spinal disorders. (R. at 64).
The Plaintiff/Appellant is a contracted provider for IHC Health Plans. (R. at
64-65). This contract requires that the Plaintiff/Appellant maintain staff privileges at an
IHC facility and also requires that certain patients with IHC Health Plans medical
insurance be treated at an IHC facility such as LDS Hospital. (R. at 65). The contract
between IHC Health Plans and the Plaintiff/Appellant also provides in part that the
Plaintiff/Appellant will provide surgical services for IHC Health Plans beneficiaries in
exchange for IHC Health Plans paying for those services. (R. at 65).
At LDS Hospital, the operating rooms typically utilize three surgical
microscopes for spine procedures and other orthopedic and neurosurgical procedures: a
newer model Zeiss surgical microscope, a Leica surgical microscope, and an older model
Zeiss surgical microscope. (R. at 65). These microscopes are owned by the hospital as
capital equipment. (R. at 66). The Defendants/Appellees have never disputed that the
Leica and newer Zeiss microscopes are superior in quality to the older Zeiss. (R. at 65).
These superior qualities allow for increased safety for the patients during various surgical
procedures. (R. at 65).
The Plaintiff/Appellant began practicing at LDS Hospital and utilized the
operative microscopes for certain procedures when they were available in the normal
course of his practice. (R. at 66). On May 23rd, 2001 the Plaintiff/Appellant had a
4

surgical case scheduled in one of the LDS operating rooms. (R. at 66).
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman indicated that the Plaintiff/Appellant was not allowed
to use either of the two newer microscopes, as they were for the exclusive use of the
Defendants/Appellees and the other members of the Neurosurgery Division as well as
neurosurgery resident physicians in training. (R. at 66). On June 1st, 2001 the
Plaintiff/Appellant sent a letter to Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman pointing out that the
use of the higher quality operative microscopes for certain procedures was in the interests
of delivering the highest possible patient care and that it was also important for patient
safety. (R. at 66). The Plaintiff/Appellant explained that the he was experienced in the
use of operative microscopes and qualified to do so. (R. at 66). The letter requested Dr.
Reichman to change his position as to who he thought could appropriately use this
equipment. (R. at 66).
Dr. Reichman did not directly respond to this request and instead asserted to
the operating room staff that he had the authority to restrict the use of the surgical
microscopes, that they belonged to the neurosurgery division and that the
Plaintiff/Appellant was forbidden to use them. (R. at 66). Plaintiff/Appellant contacted
the Chief of Surgery for LDS Hospital (Dr. Doty). (R. at 67). Plaintiff/Appellant
requested clarification as to who in fact owned and controlled the operating room
equipment at LDS Hospital. (R. at 67). On July 6th, 2001 the Plaintiff/Appellant met
with the Chief of Surgery for LDS Hospital to discuss the issue. (R. at 67). At this
meeting Dr. Doty confirmed that all of the surgical microscopes in LDS Hospital's
operating rooms were owned by LDS Hospital and he indicated and that it would be
5

acceptable and appropriate for Plaintiff/Appellant to use these surgical microscopes. (R.
at 67). Defendants/Appellees responded in writing to Robert Cash, Assistant
Administrator for the Urban Central Region at LDS Hospital stating that "[t]he
neurosurgery department is very busy and cannot provide adequate coverage for the
neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if the microscopes are not available or being used
by other services." (R. at 67). This letter also states that "[t]he neurosurgeons have met
in this regard and the opinions are unanimous." . (R. at 67-68). Defendant/Appellee Dr.
Robert Peterson's name also appeared on this letter indicating that he was acting in
concert with Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman. (R. at 67-68).
On September 17 , 2001 the Plaintiff/Appellant was waiting in the surgeons
lounge at LDS Hospital to start a spinal surgical procedure in operating room Five. (R. at
68). Plaintiff/Appellant was specifically waiting for Defendant/Appellee Dr. Robert G.
Peterson to finish his neurosurgical case in that room. (R. at 68). After
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Peterson finished his case he came into the lounge where the
Plaintiff/Appellee, a physicians assistant, and an otorhinolaryngologist surgeon with
whom Defendant/Appellee Dr. Peterson was friendly with were sitting. (R. at 68).
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Peterson had never met the Plaintiff/Appellant before this and
was therefore unaware of who he was. (R. at 68).
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Peterson began talking to this otorhinolaryngologist.
(R. at 68). He wanted to know if the otorhinolaryngologist needed a microscope for his
case. (R. at 68). Defendant/Appellee Dr. Peterson encouraged this surgeon to use the
microscope from room Five for his ENT procedure so that the Plaintiff/Appellant, who
6

was scheduled to perform his surgical procedure in Room Five after Defendant/Appellee
Dr. Peterson was finished, would not have it available for his case. (R. at 68).
Defendant/Appellee went on to state that he, himself, should "run that scope out" as "a
banned surgeon" was following him in operating room Five. (R. at 68).
From October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002 the Plaintiff/Appellant utilized the
Leica and newer Zeiss microscope without apparent problems. (R. at 69). Also during
this time period both of the Defendants/Appellees continued to assert to the operating
room staff and other physicians that they had the authority to restrict access to the
surgical microscopes. (R. at 69). This was a direct and intentional attempt to keep the
Plaintiff/Appellant from rightfully using this equipment. (R. at 69).
On April 4th, 2002 Defendants/Appellees wrote a letter to the Chief of Surgery
for LDS Hospital implying that the Plaintiff/Appellant had damaged and disassembled
the newer Zeiss and/or the Leica microscope(s). (R. at 69). Defendants/Appellees
claimed that Plaintiff/Appellant had caused a "generalized disrepair" of the microscopes
and as a result of this, treatment of neurosurgery patients to be compromised and,
operating room time and stress to be increased. (R. at 69). The Plaintiff/Appellant
claimed that these statements were fraudulent. (R. at 74). Defendants/Appellees
continued to maintain that they had a right to restrict access to the microscopes
Plaintiff/Appellant wanted to use. (R. at 69). Specifically, Defendant/Appellee Dr.
Robert Peterson's name and signature are on this letter. (R. at 69).
On July 2nd, 2002 the Plaintiff/Appellant had a patient scheduled for a
significant surgical procedure. (R. at 71). In the interests of quality assurance and patient
7

safety the use of the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscope was necessary. (R. at 71).
When the Plaintiff/Appellant came to the operating room he was told that
Defendants/Appellees were insistent that he could not use the newer Zeiss or the Leica
microscopes notwithstanding the fact that at least one of these microscopes was available
for use on that day and at that time. (R. at 71). Plaintiff/Appellant asked Dusty Clegg,
the operating room manager, what his options were and to request a suggestion on how to
best handle the problem. (R. at 71). Dusty Clegg recommended that Plaintiff/Appellant
call the Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman as Chief of Neurosurgery and if that was
unproductive to call hospital administration. (R. at 71). The Plaintiff/Appellant called
Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman and informed him that he needed to use one of the
newer microscopes and that it was available without interfering with any other scheduled
procedures. (R. at 71). Dr. Reichman, without discussion, refused to change his assertion
that he would not allow Plaintiff/Appellant use of the newer microscopes. (R. at 71).
Plaintiff/Appellant therefore called Dr. William Hamilton, Medical Director, IHC Urban
and Central Region, to explain the situation in brief. (R. at 71-72). Dr. Hamilton, after
deliberation and a phone call to Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman informed
Plaintiff/Appellant through Dusty Clegg that he could not use the microscope in question.
(R. at 72). Plaintiff/Appellant felt that given the nature of the surgical procedure, in the
interests of patient safety, the proposed procedure must be cancelled. (R. at 72).
On July 3 rd , 2002 the Plaintiff/Appellant called Dr. Hamilton requesting
information and clarification on the events of the previous day. (R. at 72). Dr. Hamilton
apologized for the outcome and said that the hospital was dependent on the neurosurgical
8

service to provide level one trauma care and they were currently in negotiations with Dr.
Reichman regarding the issue of neurosurgical trauma coverage. (R. at 72). He at no
time stated that the neurosurgical division had the authority to restrict access to the
microscope nor did he state that any of the allegations made by the Defendants/Appellees
regarding damaged or disassembled equipment were true. (R. at 72).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff/Appellant need only prove facts to support two issues in order to
maintain his action:

A.

Accepting the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant,

Plaintiff/Appellant can maintain an action for intentional interference with prospective
economic relations against the Defendants/Appellees.

B.

Defendants/Appellees acted in concert and as one party thereby equally sharing

liability for their actions and the fact that Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman was
dismissed from the action does not release Defendant/Appellee Peterson.

ARGUMENTS

A.

The Defendant/Appellee Peterson claims that not only is Plaintiffs/Appellant's

claim defective as a matter of law but, that the sole allegation in his complaint against
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him is that "he once referred to Dr. Brown as a 'banned surgeon.'" (R. at 51). In fact, the
Plaintiff s/Appellant's claims are comprehensive and very clear. Plaintiff/Appellant
claims that through a series of systematic and consistent actions, both of the defendants
intentionally used improper means to restrict access to essential hospital equipment
thereby interfering with the prospective economic relations of the Plaintiff/Appellant and
causing injury to the Plaintiff/Appellant. (R. at 31). The Plaintiff/Appellant also
demanded a specific judgment amount for damages. (R. at 33). More detail than this is
not required as the Plaintiffs/Appellant's claim need only contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to relief; and (2) a
demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Utah R. Civ. P.
8(a)(1).
Defendant/Appellee Peterson admits in his Memorandum Supporting
Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for a More
Definite Statement that Utah law recognizes the tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic relations and cites Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d
293, 304 (Utah 1982). (R. at 52-53). The Court in Leigh Furniture (and similarly in
Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993))
recognized a common-law cause of action for intentional interference with prospective
economic relations and adopted the Oregon definition of this tort. Leigh Furniture &
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982). Under this definition, in order to
recover damages, a Plaintiff must prove the following facts: (1) that the defendant
intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for
10

an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 304.
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine
issue of material fact, the court views the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in
the light most favorable to the losing party. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc.
v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). The facts and inferences to be drawn
therefrom, taken as required in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, support a
claim for intentional interference with existing or potential economic relations under Utah
law.

1. DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES INTENTIONALLY INTERFERRED WITH
THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS EXISTING OR POTENTIAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS.

Defendant/Appellees intentionally interfered with Plaintiffs/Appellant's
existing or potential economic relations by wrongfully restricting his use of essential
hospital owned equipment. The Defendants/Appellees do not deny the fact that there was
intentional interference with the use of hospital owned equipment used in the course of
certain surgical procedures. They directly and intentionally prevented Plaintiff/Appellant
from utilizing vital equipment on July 2nd, 2002. (R. at 71.) Defendants/Appellees
letters to Dr. Cash and Dr. Doty further demonstrate that the Defendants/Appellees were
intentionally interfering with the Plaintiff/Appellants delivery of medical care. (R. at 67,
69). Peterson's attempts at inducing another non-neurosurgeon to assist in his scheme of
11

interfering with the Plaintiffs/Appellant's use of vital equipment leaves no doubt as to
intent. (R. at 68). Additionally, the Defendants/Appellees have not disputed their intent.
The question then becomes one as to whether this interference was for improper purpose
or through improper means.

2. DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES INTERFERENCE WAS FOR AN
IMPROPER PURPOSE AND THEY USED IMPROPER MEANS WHEN THEY
INTENTIONALLY INTERFERED WITH THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTS
EXISTING OR POTENTIAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

The Plaintiff/Appellant is in the business of performing certain surgical
procedures some of which, for patient safety reasons require the use of operating
microscopes. (R. at 64, 75). The Plaintiff has a contract with IHC Health Plans. (R. at
65). In order to perform his obligations under this contract the Plaintiff/Appellant must
provide surgical services to IHC Health Plans beneficiaries. (R. at 65). In order to
provide certain procedures the operative microscope is vital. (R. at 75). The prospective
economic relationship is in the form of a contract between the Plaintiff/Appellant and
IHC Health Plans. In exchange for the Plaintiff/Appellant performing surgery, the patient
agrees to pay for those services either personally, or through a third party such as an
insurance company. If competitors prevent the Plaintiff/Appellant from performing
these procedures, there has been interference with his prospective economic relations. If
this interference is intentional and involve improper means, then the interfering
12

competitors have participated in an actionable tort.
Utah courts have decided that a defendant's improper intent, motive or purpose to
interfere is a necessary element of the plaintiffs case, rather than a lack thereof being a
matter of justification or privilege to be asserted as a defense by defendant. Leigh
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). Thus, to be entitled to
go to a jury, Plaintiff/Appellant must not only prove that defendant intentionally
interfered with his business relationship but also that defendant had a duty of noninterference; i.e., that he interfered for an improper purpose rather than for a legitimate
one, or that defendant used improper means which resulted in injury to plaintiff. Id at
304. The requirement of improper means is satisfied where the means used to interfere
with a party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes,
regulations, or recognized common-law rules. Id at 308. Such acts are illegal or tortious
in themselves and hence are clearly "improper" means of interference. Id.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-50l(l)(c)(i) provides that unlawful conduct includes
".. .substantially interfering with a licensee's lawful and competent practice of medicine
in accordance with this chapter by.. .any person or entity that manages, owns, operates, or
conducts a business having a direct or indirect financial interest in the licensee's
professional practice." Utah Code Annotated § 58-67-501(l)(c)(i) (2001). The
Defendants/Appellees are competitors for certain surgical patients. (R. at 64). As
competitors they have a business that has a direct or indirect financial interest in the
Plaintiffs/Appellant's professional practice. Thus, if Defendants/Appellees as competing
parties substantially interfere with the Plaintiffs/Appellant's lawful and competent
13

practice of medicine, they are in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-501(c)(i). Whether
or not the Defendants/Appellees substantially interfered with the Plaintiff/Appellant's
lawful and competent practice of medicine is a matter of fact, not law. Taken in a light
most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, the Court must find that the improper means
element of tortuous interference with prospective economic relations has been satisfied.
The improper means element of the Plaintiffs/Appellant's Claim is satisfied
under the facts of this action. "Commonly included among improper means are violence,
threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation,
defamation, or disparaging falsehood." Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d
293, 308 (Utah 1982) citing Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d
1365, 1371 (Oregon 1978).

Defendants/Appellees are neurosurgeons and LDS Hospital

depends upon them for various neurosurgical services. (R. at 72). Defendants/Appellees
used their position as neurosurgeons to intimidate the operating room staff by deceptively
asserting to the operating room staff that they had the authority to restrict the use of the
operating room microscopes. (R. at 70). Defendants/Appellees fraudulently implied that
the Plaintiff/Appellant caused damage to equipment and delay in patient treatment. (R. at
70). When the Defendants/Appellees used fraud and intimidation in furtherance of their
scheme to interfere with the Plaintiff/Appellant they have acted improperly. As a matter
of fact, taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, these statements are
false and defamatory and therefore in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-501(2)(h).
Defendant/Appellee Peterson's claimed that the Plaintiff/Appellee was a "banned
surgeon." (R. at 68). As a matter of fact, taken in a light most favorable to the
14

Plaintiff/Appellant, this statement is disparaging and false. Additionally, as a matter of
fact, Defendant/Appellee Peterson's statements and actions were unprofessional and
therefore in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-501(2)(b), § 58-l-501(2)(h) and also
therefore improper interference under guidelines established in Leigh Furniture.
Under Leigh Furniture, "[M]eans" may also be improper or wrongful because they
violate "an established standard of a trade or profession." Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co.
v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 308 (Utah 1982). Defendant/Appellee Peterson's encouraged
another (non-neurosurgeon) physician to utilize equipment exclusively for the purpose of
interfering with the Plaintiffs/Appellant's use of that equipment. (R. at 68). As a matter
of fact, taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, this behavior by
Defendant/Appellee Peterson is a violation of ethical standards of medicine and because
it is also unprofessional it is also a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-67-502(1996).
Defendant/Appellee Peterson's attempt to persuade a non-neurosurgeon to aide in his
scheme to interfere with Plaintiffs/Appellant's use of vital equipment is not only
unethical and unprofessional but directly contradicts the Defendants'/Appellees'
statement that the "neurosurgery service is very busy and cannot provide adequate
coverage for the neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if the microscopes are not
available or being used by other services" (emphasis added). (R. at 67). These facts
indicate that the Defendants/Appellees were not so much interested in any legitimate or
privileged protection of their practice, patients, or equipment but rather were solely
interested in interfering with a competitor's ability to deliver safe and high quality health
care.
15

Plaintiff/Appellant of providing surgical services to patients. (R. at 64). As a matter of
fact, taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff/Appellant, Defendants/Appellees are
experienced surgeons and as such knew that their actions would interfere with the
Plaintiffs/Appellant's practice of medicine (and potential economic relations). However,
even if a defendant does not act for the purpose of interfering or does not desire it but
knows that the interference is substantially certain to occur as a result of a defendant's
action and is a necessary consequence thereof, the interference is intentional. Mumford
v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993). Therefore
Defendants/Appellees knew or should have known that interfering with the
Plaintiffs/Appellant's ability to utilize essential equipment could and would cause
measurable and significant economic damages to the Plaintiff/Appellee.

B.

Defendants/Appellees acted in concert and as one part)/ thereby equally sharing the

liability for their actions and Defendant/Appellee Dr. Reichman's dismissal from the
action pursuant to a settlement agreement does not release Defendant/Appellee Dr.
Peterson.

1.

Defendants/Appellees are partners in a neurosurgical group practice. (R. at

64). They hold out to the public that they are a group operating together under the name
"Neurosurgical Associates." (R. at 64). Defendants/Appellees have not disputed that
they acted as partners in their interference with the Plaintiff/Appellant.
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2.

The fact that Defendant/Appellant Reichman has been dismissed from the

claim does not release Defendant/Appellant Peterson. A release given by a person
seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not discharge any other defendant
unless the release so provides. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-42 (1986).

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is
treated as one for summary judgment. Utah Rules of Civ. Procedure 12(b)(6). It is well
established that a motion for summary judgment requires that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Utah Rules of Civ. Procedure 56(c). In a case of motion for summary judgment by the
Defendant, the Plaintiff/Appellant is entitled to have the court survey the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to him.
Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah
1989).
Utah recognizes the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic
relations.

Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982). This

decision and others, hold that in order to recover damages, a Plaintiff must prove the
following facts: (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3)
causing injury to the plaintiff. The Plaintiff/Appellant's burdens for the purposes of this
18

appeal have therefore been met. The facts, taken in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff/Appellant provide ample evidence to easily support Plaintiffs/Appellant's
Claim. The Plaintiff/Appellant is a business competitor for certain spine surgery patients.
(R. at 20). Defendants/Appellees fraudulently asserted to the operating room staff that
they had a controlling ownership interest in equipment that was in fact owned and
controlled by the hospital. (R. at 69). Defendants/Appellees fraudulently implied that
Plaintiff/Appellant damaged and disassembled equipment compromising patient care. (r.
AT 69). Defendants/Appellees used their position as the sole providers of neurosurgical
services to intimidate hospital staff and administrators in violation of Utah law in order to
interfere with this competitor's business relations. (R. at 72). Defendant/Appellee
Peterson attempted to coerce a non-neurosurgeon to help him in his scheme of interfering
with Plaintiff/Appellant. (R. at 68). The Defendant's/Appellant's actions illustrates that
their purpose was not for any legitimate purpose but rather for the purpose of improperly
stifling the business of a competitor. Defendants '/Appellees' intimidation of the
operating room staff led them to restrict access to vital equipment thereby forcing the
Plaintiff/Appellant to cancel a surgical procedure valued at $18,296.50 thereby causing
significant economic injury to the Plaintiff/Appellant. (R. at 72, 80). The
Defendants/Appellees intentionally interfered with the Plaintiff s/Appellant's use of
essential equipment. The Defendant's/Appellee's intent is demonstrated by numerous
actions and written correspondences. The Defendants/Appellees interfered through fraud
and unprofessional statements and actions indicating improper purpose and improper
means. Defendants/Appellees actions caused Plaintiff/Appellant to cancel a surgical case
19

with significant value thereby causing injury to the Plaintiff/Appellant. The Third
District Court erred in granting the Defendants '/Appellees' Motion to Dismiss and this
decision should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted this 19th day of May, 2004.

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.
Attorney, acting for himself
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ADDENDUM 1:

ORDERS

1. ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF
DEFENDANT MARK REICHMAN, M.D. (R. at 91-92)
2. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PETERSON'S
MOTION TO DISMISS (R. at 113-114)
3. ORDER TRANSFERRING APPEAL TO THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT (R. at 106)
4. ORDER TRANSFERRING APPEAL TO THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS
5. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
PETERSON'S MOTION TO STRIKE
PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND GRANTING
THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 30 DAYS TO FILE A
COMPLIANT BRIEF

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D. (#7693)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
2240 Parleys Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Phone (801) 541-5492
Facsimile (801) 964-3436

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ALAN B. BROWN, M.D., J.D.
Plaintiff,
v.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT
MARK REICHMAN, M.D.
Case No. 020906986

MARK REICHMAN, M.D. and ROBERT
PETERSON, M.D.

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.

Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties and joint motion for the dismissal, with
prejudice, of Defendant Mark Reichman, M.D., on file herein, and with good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned action and the Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint therein, are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, as to Defendant Mark
Reichman, M.D. only. The parties have agreed to bear their respective costs and
attorney's fees.

DATED this

day of _

, 2002.
BY THE COURT

STEPHEN L. HENRIO
Third District Court Judgi
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

BRUCE H/ JENSEN /
Attorneyfor Defendant M

Reichman, M.D.

HAROLD L. REISER
Attorney for Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D.
100216 1

MlIB DISTRICT COUBf
Third Judicial District

Deputy~Clerk'

Alan B. Brown (#7693)
Attorney for the Plaintiff
2240 Parleys Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
(801) 541-5492
(801) 964-3436 fax

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH

Alau B. Brown, M.D., J.D.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF
DEFENDANT PETERSON

Plaintiff
v.
Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert

Case No. 020906986

Peterson, M.D.

The Honorable Judge Stephen L.

Defendants

Henriod

Pursuant to a MINUTE ENTRY issued by the Honorable Judge Stephen L.
Henriod on December 5 th , 2002 granting the Defendant's (Peterson) MOTION TO
DISMISS, on file herein, and with good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned action and the Amended
Complaint therein, is hereby dismissed, as to Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D.

i

Dated this

11

of

ftPfU4U

. 2003.

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
Third District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

HAROLD REISER
Attorney for the Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D.

ALAN BROWN, M.D., J.D.
Attorney for the Plaintiff

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

DEC 3 0 2002
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.,
Plaintiff,

ORDER
District Court No. 020906986

v.
Mark Reichman, M.D. , and
Robert Peterson, M.D.,
Defendants.

This matter is before the court on its own motion to
transfer the appeal pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is transferred to the
Utah Supreme Court because it is taken from an order, judgment or
decree of a district court in a civil case, not involving
domestic relations, and is not within the original appellate
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (1996) . See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (j) (1996) . A case number will be assigned by the Utah Supreme
Court.
Dated this

oQ

day of December, 2002.

FOR THE COURT:

V
Paulette Stagg, Aj
Clerk of the Court

Dec,,

' s *-™ r

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

No. 20021070-SC
020906986

Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert
Peterson, M.D.,
Defendants and Appellees.

ORDER
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated,
this matter
is transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. All
further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to that
court.
The address of the Utah Court of Appeals is:
Utah Court of Appeals
Office of the Clerk
450 S. State St.
PO Box 140230
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0230

FOR THE COURT:

Clerk of Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on May 13, 2003, a true and correct copy cf
the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the party(ies) listed below:
ALAN B. BROWN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2240 PARLEYS TERRACE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109
HAROLD L. REISER
PARSONS KINGHORN & PETERS
111 E BROADWAY STE 1100
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand
delivered to a personal representative of the trial court listed
below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVIN/KATHY SHUPE
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 18 60
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860

Deputy Clerk

Case No. 20021070-SC
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 020906986

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

DEC 3 0 2002
Pauiette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
coOoo
ORDER

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.,

District Court No. 02C906986

Plaintiff,
v.
Mark Reichman, M.D., and
Robert Peterson, M.D.,
Defendants.

This matter is before the court on its own motion to
transfer the appeal pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is transferred to the
Utah Supreme Court because it is taken from an order, judgment or
decree of a district court in a civil case, not involving
domestic relations, and is not within the original appellate
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (h) (1996) . See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (j) (1996) , A case number will be assigned by the Utah Supreme
Court.
Dated this

^

FOR THE COURT:

^

:>,

w

Pauiette Stagg,
Clerk of the Court

day of December, 2002

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^£) day of December, 2002, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the
United States mail to the parties listed below:
ALAN B. BROWN
224 0 PARLEYS TERRACE
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109
HAROLD REISER
185 S STATE ST STE 700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-1500
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE DEPT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this

jQ

day of December, 2002.

Deputy Clerk
District Court No.020906986

ADDENDUM 2:

RULES

1. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 8(a)(1)
2. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6)
3. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(c)

RULES

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 8(a)(1)
Rule 8(a)(a). General rules of pleadings, (a) Claims for relief. A pleading
which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6). Defenses and objections, (b) How presented. Every defense, in
law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option
of the pleader be made by motion: (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, .. .A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before
pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived
by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party
is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at
the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to
such a motion by Rule 56.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 56(c)
Rule 56(c). Summary judgment: (c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The
motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with
CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of
liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

ADDENDUM 3: STATUTES
1. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 58-l-501(2)(b) (2001)
2. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §58-1-501 (2)(h) (2001)
3. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 58-67-50l(l)(c)(i) (2001)
4. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 58-67-502 (2001)
5. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-2-2(3)0) (2001)
6. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-2-2(4) (1986)
7. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-27-42 (1986)

STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated § 58-1-501 (2001)
§58-1-501. Unlawful and unprofessional conduct: (1) "Unlawful conduct11
means conduct, by any person, that is defined as unlawful under this title.. .(2)
"Unprofessional conduct" means conduct, by a licensee or applicant, that is
defined as unprofessional conduct under this title or under any rule adopted
under this title and includes: (a) violating, or aiding or abetting any other
person to violate, any statute, rule, or order regulating an occupation or
profession under this title; (b) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person
to violate, any generally accepted professional or ethical standard applicable to
an occupation or profession regulated under this title;.. .(h) practicing or
attempting to practice an occupation or profession requiring licensure under
this title by any form of action or communication which is false, misleading,
deceptive, or fraudulent...

Utah Code Annotated § 58-67-501 (2001)
Utah Code Annotated § 58-67-501 (2001) Unlawful conduct: (1) "Unlawful
conduct" includes, in addition to the definition in Section 58-1-501: ...(c)
substantially interfering with a licensee's lawful and competent practice of
medicine in accordance with this chapter by: (i) any person or entity that

manages, owns, operates, or conducts a business having a direct or indirect
financial interest in the licensee's professional practice; or...
Utah Code Annotated § 58-67-502 (1996)
§ 58-67-502. Unprofessional conduct: "Unprofessional conduct" includes, in
addition to the definition in Section 58-1-501, using or employing the services
of any individual to assist a licensee in any manner not in accordance with the
generally recognized practices, standards, or ethics of the profession, state law,
or division rule.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(i) (2001)
§ 78-2-2(3)(i). Supreme Court jurisdiction: .. .(3) The Supreme Court has
appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:...(j)
orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction...

Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (2001)
§ 78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction:.. .(4) The Supreme Court may transfer
to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except: (a) capital felony convictions or an
appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony; (b) election and voting contests; (c) reapportionment of election
districts; (d) retention or removal of public officers; (e) matters involving

legislative subpoenas; and (f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a)
through (d).

Utah Code Annotated §78-27-42 (1986).
§78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge other defendants. A
release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not
discharge any other defendant unless the release so provides.
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PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND
JURY DEMAND
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Alan B. Brown (#7693)
A t t o r n e y , a c t i n g for h i m s e l f
2240 P a r l e y s T e r r a c e
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84109
(801) 541-5492
(801) 964-3436 fax

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND

Plaintiff

JURY DEMAND

v.
Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert
Case No.

Peterson, M.D.
Defendants

Judge

Pursuant to URCP Rule 15(a), Plaintiff requests the Court
accept this Amended Complaint and Jury Demand.

The

amendment consists of changing Claim (1) to read: "From May
23rd, 2001 through the present, Defendants have used
unprofessional and unethical conduct with the intent to
interfere with the economic relations of the Plaintiff in
violation of Utah Code 58-1-501 (2) (a), 58-1-501 (2) (b), and
58-67-501(1)(c)(i)

1

Background:
(1)

The Defendants are both licensed physicians

specializing in the practice of neurosurgery and they
both maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital
in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Defendant, Dr. Mark Reichman,

is the Chief of the Neurosurgery Division at LDS
Hospital.

(2)

The Plaintiff is a licensed physician specializing

in orthopedic surgery and who also maintains active
staff privileges at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City,
Utah.
(3)

In the normal course of their respective

businesses, the Defendants and the Plaintiff are
competitors for certain types of surgical patients
seeking treatment for spinal disorders.
(4)

The Plaintiff is a contracted provider for IHC

Health Plans.

This contract requires that the

Plaintiff maintain staff privileges at an Intermountain
Health Care facility.

The Plaintiff has continued to

maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital in
Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Plaintiff is a Board

certified orthopedic surgeon and is fellowship trained
in spine surgery,
(5)

At LDS Hospital, the operating rooms typically

utilize three surgical microscopes for spine procedures
and neurosurgical procedures: a newer model Zeiss
surgical microscope, a Leica surgical microscope, and
an older model Zeiss surgical microscope.

At LDS

hospital, the operating rooms are numbered sequentially
for identification.

The newer Zeiss and the Leica

microscope are typically stored and ready for use in
operating room number Four and operating room number
Five.

These two microscopes are equipped so that a

surgical assistant has a binocular head directly across
from the operating surgeon allowing him to have
essentially the same surgical perspective as the
operating surgeon.

This provides a measure of

increased safety for the patient and also allows a more
comfortable environment for the operative assistant.
These two microscopes are also equipped with superior

optics and other features allowing a higher quality
view and greater ease and flexibility for the surgeon
and assistant during a surgical procedure.

The older

model Zeiss does not have these features and instead
has an offset opposing headpiece that forces the
assistant to be in an awkward position when she is
assisting and does not allow for the same surgical
perspective as the operating surgeon.

It is generally

a far inferior piece of equipment.
(6)

The Plaintiff began practicing at LDS Hospital and

utilized the operative microscopes for certain
procedures when they were available in the normal
course of his practice.

These microscopes are owned by

the hospital as capital equipment.

On May 23 rd , 2001

the plaintiff had a surgical case scheduled in the LDS
operating room.

The Plaintiff's surgical case was

scheduled in an operating room not typically utilized
by the neurosurgical service.

On that date there was a

surgical microscope appropriate for the Plaintiff s
needs physically located in another operating room
where one of the defendants, Dr. Mark Reichman, was

performing a neurosurgical procedure.

Dr. Reichman was

not using a microscope for the particular procedure he
was performing. The Plaintiff asked Dr. Reichman if he
was using the microscope in that operating room and if
not, would he mind if the microscope was moved to
another room so that the Plaintiff could use it. The
microscopes are designed to be easily and safely moved
from one place to another.

Dr. Reichman asserted that

the microscope was for neurosurgical procedures only.
The Plaintiff pointed out that he wanted to use the
microscope for a cervical spine fusion, a procedure
commonly done as a neurosurgical procedure by
neurosurgeons.

Dr. Reichman then took the position

that he had a proprietary interest in the microscope
and that the microscope in the room he was operating in
was for use by neurosurgeons only.

He further asserted

that use by non-neurosurgeons would lead to damage of
the equipment and he suggested that the plaintiff buy
his own microscope.
(7)

On June 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff sent a letter to

Dr. Reichman pointing out that the use of the operative

microscope for certain procedures was in the interests
of delivering the highest possible patient care and
that it was also important for patient safety. The
Plaintiff explained that the he was experienced in the
use of operative microscopes and qualified to do so.
The letter requested Dr. Reichman to change his
position as to who he thought could appropriately use
this equipment.
(8)

Dr. Reichman did not directly respond to this

request and instead asserted to the operating room
staff that he had the authority to restrict the use of
the surgical microscopes, that they belonged to the
neurosurgery division and that the Plaintiff was
forbidden to use them.
(9)

Dr. Brown requested clarification from Dr. Doty,

the Chief of Surgery at LDS hospital, as to who in fact
owned and controlled the operating room equipment at
LDS Hospital.

On July 6th, 2001 the Plaintiff met with

Dr. Doty to discuss the issue.

At this meeting Dr.

Doty confirmed that the surgical microscopes in the LDS
Hospital operating rooms were owned by LDS Hospital and

he indicated and that it would be acceptable and
appropriate for Dr. Brown to use the surgical
microscopes.
(10)

Dr. Reichman responded in writing to Robert Cash,

Assistant Administrator for the Urban Central Region at
LDS Hospital stating that "[t]he neurosurgery
department is very busy and cannot provide adequate
coverage for the neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if
the microscopes are not available or being used by
other services."

He went on to state that the

neurosurgeons would allow the Plaintiff the use of the
older Zeiss microscope.

He also went on to state that

none of the neurosurgeons at LDS Hospital have any
problem using this older Zeiss microscope when the
newer Zeiss or Leica microscopes were not available.
(11)

On September 17th, 2001 the Plaintiff was waiting

in the surgeons lounge at LDS Hospital to start a
spinal surgery operation in operating room Five.
Plaintiff was specifically waiting for Defendant Dr.
Robert G. Peterson to finish his neurosurgical case in
that room.

After Dr. Peterson finished his case he
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came into the lounge where the Plaintiff, a physicians
assistant, and a otorhinolaryngologist(ENT) surgeon who
Dr. Peterson was friendly with were sitting.

Dr.

Peterson had never met the Plaintiff before this and
was therefore unaware of who he was.
began talking to the ENT surgeon.

Dr. Peterson

He wanted to know if

the ENT surgeon needed a microscope for his case.

He

encouraged the ENT surgeon to use the microscope from
room Five for his ENT procedure so that the Plaintiff,
who was scheduled to perform a surgical procedure in
Room Five after Dr. Peterson was finished, would not
have it available for his case.

He went on to state

that he, himself, should "run that scope out" as "a
banned surgeon" was following him in operating room
Five.

The Plaintiff overheard this and responded by

going over to the Defendant and politely stating that
he would like to introduce himself and that he was
"Alan Brown, the banned surgeon."
(12)

On October 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff wrote to Dr.

Doty agreeing to follow Dr. Reichman's August 1st, 2001
suggestion that the Plaintiff use the older Zeiss but

contingent on some modifications being made.

These

modifications consisted of replacing the offset
assistant's head with an opposing head and upgrading
some of the other features and optics.

These

modifications could be done if the hospital was willing
to expend the money for those modifications.

The

Plaintiff suggested that it was reasonable for him to
continue to use the new Zeiss and the Leica microscopes
until the appropriate modifications were made.
Plaintiff also agreed that his use would only be when
these microscopes were not being utilized by the
neurosurgery service and therefore there would be no
conflict or patient safety issue. Additionally, the
Plaintiff documented in this letter to Dr. Doty the
incident with Dr. Peterson on September 17th.

The

Plaintiff pointed out that it seemed that the
neurosurgery service was more interested in interfering
with the Plaintiff's practice than from keeping all
other services from using the microscopes as had been
previously suggested by the Defendants.

There was no

written or verbal response to this letter.

(13)

From October 1st, 2001 until July 2 nd , 2002 the

Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope
without apparent problems.

Also during this time

period Dr. Reichman continued to assert to the
operating room staff that he had the authority to
restrict access to the surgical microscopes in an
attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using
this equipment.
(14)

On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to

Dr. Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and
disassembled the newer Ziess and/or the Leica
microscope(s).

Defendants argued that as a result of

the Plaintiff's causing a "generalized disrepair" of
the microscopes, treatment of neurosurgery patients had
been compromised and operating room time and stress had
increased.

Defendants continued to maintain that they

had a right to restrict access to the microscopes
Plaintiff wanted to use.

A copy of this letter was

sent to Dr. Doty and to the Dusty Clegg, R.N.,
Department Manager for the operating rooms.
Plaintiff was not sent a copy of this letter.

The

Plaintiff denies the truth of the allegations in this
letter and is unaware of any documentation or proof of
the allegations in this letter.
(15)

On July 2 nd , 2002 the Plaintiff had a patient

scheduled for a significant surgical procedure. The
Plaintiff also was of the opinion that in the interests
of quality assurance and patient safety, a skilled
surgical assistant and the newer Zeiss or the Leica
microscope was optimal.

The modifications to the older

Zeiss microscope had still not been done.

When the

Plaintiff came to the operating room he was told that
Defendants were insistent that he could not use the
newer Zeiss or the Leica microscopes.

This was despite

the fact that at least one of these microscopes was
available for use on that day as was one of the
neurosurgical operating rooms where this microscope was
located.

Plaintiff asked what his options were and

called Dusty Clegg to request a suggestion on how to
best handle the problem.

Dusty Clegg recommended that

Plaintiff call Dr. Reichman and if that was
unproductive to call hospital administration.
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The

Plaintiff called Dr. Reichman and informed him that he
wanted to use one of the microscopes that Dr. Reichman
had restricted. Dr. Reichman, without discussion,
refused to change his assertion that the Plaintiff did
not have Dr. Reichman's permission to use the
microscopes.

Plaintiff called Dr. William Hamilton,

Medical Director, IHC Urban and Central Region, to
explain the situation in brief.

Dr. Hamilton, after

some deliberation and phone calls informed Plaintiff
through Dusty Clegg that he could not use the
microscope in question.

Plaintiff felt uncomfortable

using sub-optimal equipment on his patient and canceled
the procedure.
(16)

The following day the Plaintiff called Dr.

Hamilton requesting information and clarification on
what happened the previous day.

Dr. Hamilton

apologized for the outcome and said that the hospital
was dependent on the neurosurgical service to provide
level one trauma care and also that the hospital was
currently in negotiations with Dr. Reichman regarding
the issue of neurosurgical coverage for trauma.

1O

He at

no time stated that Dr. Reichman had the authority to
restrict access to the microscope nor did he state that
any of the allegations made by the Defendants regarding
damaged or disassembled equipment were true or even
documented.

CLAIMS
(1)

From May 23 rd , 2001 through the present,
Defendants have used unprofessional and unethical
conduct with the intent to interfere with the
economic relations of the Plaintiff in violation
of Utah Code 58-1-501 (2) (a), 58-1-501 (2) (b), and
58-67-501(1)(c)(i).

(2)

By misrepresenting his authority and intimidating
the Plaintiff and the LDS Hospital operating room
staff as well as hospital administrators,
defendant Dr. Mark Reichman has practiced and
attempted to practice his occupation using actions
and communications which are false, misleading,
deceptive and fraudulent in violation of Utah Code
Section 58-1-501(2)(h).
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(3)

Defendants have engaged in a pattern of activity
including directly and indirectly intimidating
others through actions and/or omissions with the
intent to interfere with the Plaintiff's economic
relations by wrongfully restricting access to
essential hospital equipment for an improper
purpose and through improper means causing injury
to the Plaintiff.

(4)

The Defendant's malicious intent and unlawful
methods will not support an affirmative defense of
privilege,

(5)

Even if the Defendant's acts were not for the
purpose of interfering with the Plaintiff s
economic relations or even if the Defendants did
not desire to interfere with the Plaintiff's
economic relations, the Defendants knew that
interference was substantially certain to occur as
a result of their actions and as a necessary
consequence thereof, the interference was
intentional.

(6)

Witnesses and documents will establish clear and

convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of
the Defendants are the result of willful and
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or
conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the
rights of the Plaintiff as required for punitive
damages pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-18-

K D (a) .

Demands:

(1)

Plaintiff requests relief in the amount of
$18,296.50 representing actual damages.

(2)

Plaintiff requests the Court award punitive
damages and the costs of this suit and such
further relief as the Courts sees fit.

(3)

Plaintiff requests permission to add parties and
causes of action at a later date consistent with

1 C

evidence adduced through discovery.

(4)

Plaintiff requests any additional damages accrued
as a result of the Defendant's continued unlawful
actions and omissions.

(5)

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief against
future actions and/or omissions by the Defendants
that would result in unlawful interference with
the Plaintiff's economic relations.

Dated July 29 th , 2002.

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.
Attorney, acting for himself:
Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.
2240 Parleys Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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Harold L. Reiser (4396)
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS

185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1500
Telephone: (801) 363-4300
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Attorneys for Defendant - Robert Peterson, M.D.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALAN B. BROWN, M.D., J.D.
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK REICHMAN, M.D. and ROBERT
PETERSON, M.D.
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
DEFENDANT PETERSON'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE
STATEMENT
Civil No. 020906986
Judge Stephen L. Henroid

Defendant, Robert Peterson, M.D. ("Dr. Peterson"), has moved under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, to dismiss the Complaint of Alan Brown,

M.D. ("Dr. Brown")

pro se, on the grounds that the allegations do not state a claim against him. Alternatively, Dr.
Peterson moves for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

This action arises from plaintiffs desire to use a particular microscope in a surgical
procedure. Dr. Brown seeks actual damages of $ 18,296.50 for unspecified economic injury, punitive
damages and injunctive relief.
In the Complaint, the sole allegation against Dr. Peterson is that he once referred to Dr.
Brown as a "banned surgeon", a reference to Dr. Brown's use of a particular microscope used by

other surgeons. Plaintiff alleges that because he could not use a microscope of his choosing in
surgery, Dr. Peterson has "intended" to interfere with Plaintiffs prospective economic relations and
somehow damaged Dr. Brown.1

Dr. Brown cryptically alleges that the Defendants, both

neurological surgeons, "have engaged in a pattern of activity including directly and indirectly
intimidating others through actions and/or omissions with the intent to interfere with Plaintiffs
economic relations by wrongfully restricting access to essential hospital equipment for an improper
purpose and through improper means causing injury to the Plaintiff." Complaint at 13. Further,
defects in the pleadings are revealed by Dr. Brown inconsistently claiming that "even if the
Defendant's [sic] acts were not for the purpose of interfering with the Plaintiffs economic relations
. . . the interference was intentional. Complaint at 14.
Distilled to its essence and given the very most liberal construction to his pleadings, Dr.
Brown complains that, because he is not able to use a particular microscope in surgery, he has been
damaged. Dr. Brown concedes that other microscopes, although allegedly "inferior" were available
for his use. Complaint at 2, 3. Nonetheless, because he could not use a particular microscope, the
defendants have intended to interfere with his economic relations.
Utah law does not recognize the tort of "intent" to interfere with prospective economic
relations but, rather, the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Dr.
Brown concedes that even though Dr. Brown may not have actually interfered with Dr. Brown's
prospective economic relations, the interference was intentional. Complaint at 14, f 5. Having
conceded that there was no actual interference with Dr. Brown's actual economic relations, under

1

The microscopes in question are owned by the hospital as capital equipment. Complaint at 4.
2

the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 304
(Utah 1982), the Complaint is defective and must therefore be dismissed.
In Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. horn, the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant is
liable for tortious interference with business relationships if the plaintiff proves "(1) that the
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2)
for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." A party is subject
to liability for an intentional interference with present contractual relations if he intentionally and
improperly causes one of the parties not to perform the contract. Restatement (Second) of Torts §
766 (1979). St Benedict's Development Company v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 201
(Utah 1991). Conspicuous by its absence is any factual allegation that Dr. Brown intentionally or
otherwise unlawfully caused Dr. Brown to not perform any contract or otherwise interfered with any
economic relationship as required under Leigh Furniture & Carpet and St. Benedict's Development
Company Co. Distilled to its essence, Dr. Peterson commented that Dr. Brown was a "banned
surgeon" and could not use a particular microscope. Dr. Brown admits that after this single
comment on September 17, 2002, that "from October 1st, 2001 until July 2nd, 2002, the Plaintiff
utilized the Leica and newer Ziess microscope without apparent problems." Complaint at 9.
Thereafter, the pleadings are absent as to any other reasonable inference that Dr. Peterson committed
any unlawful act or other breach of duty allegedly owed to Dr. Brown. There is simply no allegation
in the Complaint that defendant interfered with any contract or economic relationship. Plaintiff, a
medical doctor, does not specify how his economic relations were affected or whether patients were

3

ill-served by anything that defendant did or didn't do.2 As trite as it may seem, Dr. Brown does not
have, and has not alleged, that he has a contractual right to use any particular microscope. Dr.
Brown recites that he petitioned hospital administration about the dispute but that there has been "no
written or verbal response[s]" to his letter. Complaint 9. Presumably, his damages are the cost of
a new microscope. If not, then the pleadings give insufficient particularity for Dr. Brown to frame
a responsive pleading other than a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs complaint is also defective because he has no standing to bring claims under Utah
Code Ann Section 58-l-501(2)(a), (2)(b)b and 58-67-50l(c)(i).

Proceedings for alleged

unprofessional or unethical conduct is exclusively the duty of Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing under Chapter 58 of the Utah Code. Plaintiff has no standing to allege
violations of Utah law in this civil action.
CONCLUSION
With undisputed Utah law and precedent dictating what actions may be lawfully addressed
in this state's courts, Dr. Brown's allegations against Dr. Peterson are defective as a matter of law.
Dr. Peterson should not have to defend against such defective and trivial accusations. Plaintiff has
failed to satisfy the requirements of Utah law and accordingly, Plaintiffs complaint falls short of
stating a claim for tortious interference with economic relations and may be properly dismissed.
Without more, no claim for interference with economic relations can lie and Dr. Peterson's Motion
to Dismiss may be granted.

2

Plaintiff alleges that on July 2,2002, ten (10) months after the "banned surgeon" comment, he "felt
uncomfortable using sub-optimal equipment on his patient and canceled the procedure." Complaint
at 12. Plaintiff does not allege whether this alleged cancellation caused any damages, whether the
procedure was later rescheduled nor does he allege how Dr. Peterson (or any other person)
improperly interfered with the surgical procedure.
4

DR. PETERSON'S ALTERNATIVE MOTION
FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
Alternatively, Dr. Brown should be required to make a more definite statement under Rule
12(e) of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE how {and if) any Defendant actually and
intentionally interfered with the Plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations; (2) clarifying
the improper purpose or by improper means employed by any Defendant; and (3) how the Plaintiff
was injured as required under Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. The Plaintiff should also
clarify his claims for relief which indiscriminately refer to "Defendant's" action without any
reference to a particular Defendant. See, e.g., Complaint at 13. ("The Defendant's [sic] malicious
intent and unlawful methods will not support an affirmative defense of privilege.")
Plaintiffs complaint fails to give sufficient detail or notice to Dr. Peterson so he can frame
a responsive pleading or craft discovery to defend against the allegations in the complaint. If the
complaint if not dismissed for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff should give a more definite statement
as to the claims he makes against Dr. Peterson.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of August, 2002.
PARSONS, DAVJES, KINGHORN^? PETERS

^_4J———— ——
Ha#ld L. Reiser
Attorneysfor Defendant Robert Peterson, M.D.
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PLAINTIFF'S/APPELLANT'S MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
DEFAULT ENTRY AND AGAINST DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MORE
DEFINITE STATEMENT

Alan B. Brown (#7693)
Attorney, acting for himself
2240 Parleys Terrace
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
(801) 541-5492
(801) 964-3436 fax

FILES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUG 2 9 2002
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.
Plaintiff

Memorandum Supporting Default
Entry and Against Defendant's

v.

Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's

Mark Reichman, M.D. and Robert

Motion for a More Definite Statement

Peterson, M.D.
Defendants

Case No. 020906986
The Honorable Judge Stephen L.
Henriod

Plaintiff had a constable properly serve the Defendant with
a Complaint and Ten Day Summons on July 23rd, 2002.

On

August 15th, 2002 Defendant Robert Peterson had still failed
to answer and so Plaintiff moved for a Default Judgment
pursuant to URCP 55(a)(1).

On August 23rd, 2002 Defendant

moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Claim pursuant to URCP 12(b)(6)
on the grounds that the Plaintiff's allegations do not state

a Claim.

In the alternative, Defendant made a Motion for a

More Definite Statement.

I.

Defendant's Motion is Barred as Defendant Has Failed
to Plead as Required by URCP 12(a)

A,

FACTS
Defendants Dr. Mark Reichman and Dr. Robert Peterson

were personally served by a constable on July 23 rd , 2001 with
a Complaint and Ten Day Summons as required under URCP 4.
Proof of Service, a copy of the Claim and Ten Day Summons has
been filed with the Court as required under URCP 3(a). An
Amended Complaint was filed with the Court and served upon
the Defendants on August 29th, 2002.

Robert Peterson, M.D.

failed to plead or otherwise defend as required by URCP 12(a)
until after August 16th, 2002.

Pursuant to URCP 55(a)(1),

Plaintiff moved for a Default Judgment against defendant Dr.
Robert Peterson on August 15th.

B.

ISSUE
URCP 60(b) provides in part that on motion and upon

such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of

justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.

Defendant Robert Peterson

discussed the Complaint with his partner and co-defendant
Mark Reichman.

Dr. Reichman emphasized to Dr. Peterson that

they needed separate counsel and that the Complaint needed
to be answered.

Dr. Peterson is a Board certified

Neurosurgeon with extensive education and training.
Defendant Peterson's failure to plead in a timely manner
indicates indifference to the legal process and therefore

does not entitle him to relief under URCP 60(b).

II.

Plaintiff's Response to Request for a More Definite
Statement and Defense that His Complaint States a
Claim for which Relief Could be Granted.

A.

FACTS:
The Defendants are both licensed physicians

specializing in the practice of neurosurgery.

Both

Defendants maintain active staff privileges at LDS Hospital
in Salt Lake City, Utah.

The Defendants are also partners

acting under the business name Neurosurgical Associates,
L.L.C.

Defendant Dr. Mark Reichman, is the Chief of the

Neurosurgery Division at LDS Hospital.

The Plaintiff is a

licensed physician specializing in orthopedic surgery and
who also maintains active staff privileges at LDS Hospital
in Salt Lake City, Utah.

In the normal course of their

respective businesses, the Defendants and the Plaintiff are
competitors for certain types of surgical patients seeking
treatment for spinal disorders.
The Plaintiff is a contracted provider for IHC

Health Plans.

This contract requires that the Plaintiff

maintain staff privileges at an Intermountain Health Care
facility and also requires that certain patients with IHC
Health Plan medical insurance be treated at an IHC
contracted hospital such as LDS Hospital.

The contract

between IHC Health Plans and the Plaintiff also provides
generally that the Plaintiff will provide surgical services
for IHC Health Plans' beneficiaries in exchange for IHC
Health Plans paying for those services.

The Plaintiff has

continued to maintain active staff privileges at LDS
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah.
At LDS Hospital, the operating rooms typically
utilize three surgical microscopes for spine procedures and
neurosurgical procedures: a newer model Zeiss surgical
microscope, a Leica surgical microscope, and an older model
Zeiss surgical microscope.

The Defendant's have never

disputed that the Leica and newer Zeiss microscopes are
superior in quality to the older Zeiss.

These superior

quality makes certain surgical procedures safer for the
patients and more comfortable for the surgeon and the
surgical assistant.

The Plaintiff began practicing at LDS Hospital and
utilized the operative microscopes for certain procedures
when they were available in the normal course of his
practice.

These microscopes are owned by the hospital as

capital equipment.

On May 23 rd , 2001 the plaintiff had a

surgical case scheduled in the LDS operating room.

Dr.

Reichman indicated that the Plaintiff was not allowed to use
either of the two newer microscopes as they were for the
exclusive use of the Defendants and the other members of the
Neurosurgery Division as well as neurosurgery resident
physicians in training.

On June 1st, 2001 the Plaintiff

sent a letter to Dr. Reichman pointing out that the use of
the operative microscope for certain procedures was in the
interests of delivering the highest possible patient care
and that it was also important for patient safety. The
Plaintiff explained that the he was experienced in the use
of operative microscopes and qualified to do so.

The letter

requested Dr. Reichman to change his position as to who he
thought could appropriately use this equipment.
Dr. Reichman did not directly respond to this
request and instead asserted to the operating room staff

that he had the authority to restrict the use of the
surgical microscopes, that they belonged to the neurosurgery
division and that the Plaintiff was forbidden to use them.
Dr. Brown requested clarification from Dr. Doty, the Chief
of Surgery at LDS hospital, as to who in fact owned and
controlled the operating room equipment at LDS Hospital.

On

July 6th, 2001 the Plaintiff met with Dr. Doty to discuss
the issue.

At this meeting Dr. Doty confirmed that the

surgical microscopes in the LDS Hospital operating rooms
were owned by LDS Hospital and he indicated and that it
would be acceptable and appropriate for Dr. Brown to use the
surgical microscopes.
Dr. Reichman responded in writing to Robert Cash,
Assistant Administrator for the Urban Central Region at LDS
Hospital stating that

xx

[t]he neurosurgery department is very

busy and cannot provide adequate coverage for the
neurosurgical needs of LDS Hospital if the microscopes are
not available or being used by other services."

This

letter also states that "[t]he neurosurgeons have met in
this regard and the opinions are unanimous."

Defendant

Robert Peterson's name is on the letterhead indicating that
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he was acting in concert with Dr. Reichman on this issue.
On September 17th, 2001 the Plaintiff was waiting in
the surgeons lounge at LDS Hospital to start a spinal
surgery operation in operating room Five.

Plaintiff was

specifically waiting for Defendant Dr. Robert G. Peterson to
finish his neurosurgical case in that room.

After Dr.

Peterson finished his case he came into the lounge where the
Plaintiff, a physicians assistant, and a
otorhinolaryngologist(ENT) surgeon with whom Dr. Peterson
was friendly with were sitting.

Dr. Peterson had never met

the Plaintiff before this and was therefore unaware of who
he was.

Dr. Peterson began talking to the ENT surgeon.

He

wanted to know if the ENT surgeon needed a microscope for
his case.

He encouraged the ENT surgeon to use the

microscope from room Five for his ENT procedure so that the
Plaintiff, who was scheduled to perform a surgical procedure
in Room Five after Dr. Peterson was finished, would not have
it available for his case.

He went on to state that he,

himself, should "run that scope out" as "a banned surgeon"
was following him in operating room Five.

The Plaintiff

overheard this and responded by going over to the Defendant

and politely stating that he would like to introduce himself
and that he was "Alan Brown, the banned surgeon."
From October 1st, 2001 until July 2 nd , 2002 the
Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope
without apparent problems.

Also during this time period

both of the Defendant's continued to assert to the operating
room staff and other physicians that they had the authority
to restrict access to the surgical microscopes-

This was a

direct attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using
this equipment.
On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to Dr.
Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and
disassembled the newer Zeiss and/or the Leica microscope(s).
Defendants argued that as a result of the Plaintiff's
causing a "generalized disrepair" of the microscopes,
treatment of neurosurgery patients had been compromised and
operating room time and stress had increased.

Defendants

continued to maintain that they had a right to restrict
access to the microscopes Plaintiff wanted to use.

The

signatures and typed names of both Defendants are on this
letter.

and politely stating that he would like to introduce himself
and that he was "Alan Brown, the banned surgeon."
From October 1st, 2001 until July 2 Qd , 2002 the
Plaintiff utilized the Leica and newer Zeiss microscope
without apparent problems.

Also during this time period

both of the Defendants continued to assert to the operating
room staff and other physicians that they had the authority
to restrict access to the surgical microscopes.

This was a

direct attempt to keep the Plaintiff from rightfully using
this equipment.
On April 4th, 2002 Defendants wrote a letter to Dr.
Doty implying that the Plaintiff had damaged and
disassembled the newer Zeiss and/or the Leica microscope (s) .
Defendants argued that as a result of the Plaintiff's
causing a "generalized disrepair" of the microscopes,
treatment of neurosurgery patients had been compromised and
operating room time and stress had increased.

Defendants

continued to maintain that they had a right to restrict
access to the microscopes Plaintiff wanted to use.

The

signatures and typed names of both Defendants are on this
letter.

On July 2 nd , 2002 the Plaintiff had a patient
scheduled for a significant surgical procedure. The
Plaintiff also was of the opinion that in the interests of
quality assurance and patient safety, a skilled surgical
assistant and the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscope was
necessary.

When the Plaintiff came to the operating room he

was told that Defendants were insistent that he could not
use the newer Zeiss or the Leica microscopes.

This was

despite the fact that at least one of these microscopes was
available for use on that day as was one of the
neurosurgical operating rooms where this microscope was
located.

Plaintiff asked Dusty Clegg, the operating room

manager, what his options were and to request a suggestion
on how to best handle the problem.

Dusty Clegg recommended

that Plaintiff call Dr. Reichman and if that was
unproductive to call hospital administration.

The Plaintiff

called Dr. Reichman and informed him that he wanted to use
one of the microscopes that Dr. Reichman had restricted.
Dr. Reichman, without discussion, refused to change his
assertion that the Plaintiff did not have Dr. Reichman's
permission to use the microscopes.

Plaintiff called Dr.

William Hamilton, Medical Director, IHC Urban and Central
Region, to explain the situation in brief.

Dr. Hamilton,

after some deliberation and phone calls informed Plaintiff
through Dusty Clegg that he could not use the microscope in
question.

Plaintiff felt that given the nature of the

surgical procedure, in the interests of patient safety the
case should be cancelled.
The following day the Plaintiff called Dr. Hamilton
requesting information and clarification on what happened
the previous day.

Dr. Hamilton apologized for the outcome

and said that the hospital was dependent on the
neurosurgical service to provide level one trauma care and
also that the hospital was currently in negotiations with
Dr. Reichman regarding the issue of neurosurgical coverage
for trauma.

He at no time stated that the neurosurgical

division had the authority to restrict access to the
microscope nor did he state that any of the allegations made
by the Defendants regarding damaged or disassembled
equipment were true or even documented.
B.

ISSUES
1.

Defendant Robert Peterson admits that Utah

11

law recognizes the tort of intentional interference with
prospective economic relations and cites Leigh
Carpet

Co. v.

Isom,

Furniture

&

657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982).x

Defendant Peterson asserts that Plaintiff's Complaint is
defective because Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant
Peterson intentionally interfered with any of the
Plaintiff's contracts as required under Leigh
The Court in Leigh
ITT Commercial

Furniture

Finance

Corp.3)

Furniture.2

(and similarly in Mumford

v.

recognized a common-law cause

of action for intentional interference with prospective
economic relations, and adopted the Oregon definition of
this tort.4 Under this definition, in order to recover
damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant
intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or
potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or
by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff.5 The
Court also noted that privilege is an affirmative defense.6

1

2
3

4
5
6

Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement at 2.
Id.
Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App.
1993) .
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982)
Id,, at 304.
Id.

The tort of interference with economic relations
is an intentional tort.7

Plaintiff will present evidence

that will show that Defendant's intentionally interfered
with the Plaintiff's existing and potential economic
relations with his patients and their insurance company.
This evidence will include documents and testimony that will
prove that the Defendants wrongfully and unlawfully used
their positions as the providers of neurosurgical services
to LDS Hospital to intimidate the hospital, staff and
administration with the specific intent to restrict the
Plaintiff's use of certain equipment.

Plaintiff will

thereby satisfy the intent requirement under Mumford

Commercial

Finance

Corp8

and Leigh

v. ITT

Furniture.9

Plaintiff also intends to prove that the Defendants
made fraudulent and misleading statements in order to
further their goal of interfering with the Plaintiff's
economic relations.

The improper means element in

Mumford

is satisfied when "the means used to interfere with a
party's economic relations are contrary to law, such as

7

8
9

Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah)
App. 1993).
Id.
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 305 (Utah 1982).

violations of statutes, regulation, or recognized common-law
rules.10

Such acts are illegal or tortious in themselves

and hence are clearly ^improper' means of interference../'11
"Commonly included among improper means are violence,
threats or other intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation
bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation, or disparaging
falsehood."12 Means may also be improper or wrongful because
they violate "an established standard of a trade or
profession."13

In the instant case, Defendant's have

interfered with Plaintiff's practice in violation of Utah
Code 58-1-501(2) (a), 58-1-501(2) (b), and 58-67-501(1) (c) (i) .
They have also used intimidation and violated standards of
the profession of medicine.

The Plaintiff will prove that

the improper means element is satisfied.
Plaintiff asserts that under certain circumstances
the equipment in question is vital to his economic relations
in that it allows him to provide increased safety and a
higher quality of care to his patients.

10

11
12

13

As a direct result

Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah
App. 1993).
Id.
Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1371
and FN 11 (Oregon 1978).
Id., at 1371.

of the Defendant's interference with the Plaintiff's
economic relations, the Plaintiff was forced to cancel a
surgical case thereby causing economic injury to the
Plaintiff.
2.

Defendant Peterson, in his Motion to Dismiss,

claims that Plaintiff conceded that there was no actual
interference with the Plaintiff's economic relations.14
fact, Plaintiff concedes nothing of the sort.

In

Plaintiff

merely points out that even if a Defendant does not act for
the purpose of interfering or does not desire it but knows
that the interference is substantially certain to occur as a
result of a defendant's action and is a necessary
consequence thereof, the interference is intentional.15
URCP 8(e)(2) provides in part that "[a]

party may set forth

two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in
separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are
made in the alternative and one of them if made
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made

14

15

Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 2.
Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 858 P2d 1041, 1044 (Utah
App. 1993).

insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may also state as many
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of
consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable
grounds or on both.16

The Plaintiff's Complaint is not

defective on the grounds that he conceded that there was no
actual interference.

Plaintiff's Complaint does not support

this defense.
3.

Defendant Peterson claims that Plaintiff's

pleadings are absent any reasonable inference that Defendant
Peterson committed any unlawful act or other breach of duty
allegedly owed to Dr. Brown.17 The Defendants are partners
sharing various duties and responsibilities in a contractual
relationship.

Additionally, Defendant Reichman has

indicated that his actions and allegations are supported by
all of his partners and his assertions are representative of
all the members of Neurosurgical Associates, L.L.C.
Defendant Peterson is a member of Neurosurgical Associates,
L.L.C. and his signature appears on a letter that

1-7
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fraudulently implies that Plaintiff caused damage to
equipment and delay in patient treatment.

Therefore, any

actions that the Claim charges against Defendant Reichman is
also imputed to Defendant Peterson.

Additionally,

Defendant's actions, including his statements to other
physicians that Plaintiff was a banned surgeon and that the
Defendant should physically remove a vital piece of
equipment from an operating room in order to keep the
Plaintiff from rightfully using that piece of equipment is
consistent with the Plaintiff's allegations of
unprofessional and unlawful behavior.

Plaintiff has stated

claims very particularly and very specifically against both
of the Defendants.
4.

Defendant claims that Plaintiff's Complaint

does not specify how his economic relations were affected or
whether patients were ill served by anything that the
Defendant did or did not do.18

Plaintiff was unwilling to

subject a patient to unnecessary and increased risk by using
an inferior piece of equipment when safer and higher quality
equipment was available.

18

Id. at 4.

Although the equipment was

physically available, the Defendant's wrongful and unlawful
actions directly and indirectly restricted the Plaintiff's
access to this equipment.

Therefore, in the interests of

patient safety and quality of patient care, Plaintiff
canceled a surgical procedure when the Defendant's
interfered with his attempt at fulfilling his obligations
under his contract with IHC Health Plans.

Plaintiff's

Complaint very specifically points out that as a direct
result of the Defendant's interference with his economic
relations, the Plaintiff was forced to cancel a surgical
case.19

The Defendant knew, or should have known that this

result was a likely and necessary consequence of his
actions.

Defendant Peterson is in the business of providing

surgical services to patients.

Defendant Peterson is well

aware of the economic consequences of canceling a scheduled
surgical case.

The claim by Defendant Peterson that there

is no factual allegation that Dr. Peterson intentionally or
otherwise unlawfully caused Plaintiff to not perform any
contract or otherwise interfered with Plaintiff's economic
relations is without merit.

19

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at 12.

5,

Defendant Peterson has alleged that

Plaintiff's Complaint is defective in that it gives
insufficient particularity regarding damages.20

Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint specifies actual damages as $18,296.50.
This amount represents the approximate surgical fee for the
cancelled case.
6.

Defendant Peterson alleges that Plaintiff's

Complaint is defective because he has no standing to bring
claims under Utah Code Ann Section 58-1-501(2)(a), (2)(b),
and 58-67-501 (a) (c) (i) .

Plaintiff is not claiming that he

has standing to bring action based on violations of these
Code Sections.

Plaintiff is merely pointing out that the

Defendants have violated these Code Sections thereby
supporting his claim that the Defendants have improperly (as
defined in Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. 858 P.2d.
1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993)) interfered with his economic
relations.
C.

CONCLUSIONS
1.

URCP 12(b)(6) provides that a motion to

20

Memorandum Supporting Defendant Peterson's Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement, at 4.

21

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, at 15.

dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is treated as one for summary judgment.
It is well established that a motion for summary judgment
requires that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.22 In a case of motion for
summary judgment by the Defendant, the Plaintiff is
entitled to have the court survey the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to him.23

Plaintiff has fairly and

with specificity stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

There are many issues of material fact which

would affect the outcome of this matter and so Plaintiff
respectfully requests that Defendant's motion to dismiss
is denied.
2.

Plaintiff has set forth his claims with

specificity and particularity.
are neither vague nor ambiguous.

Plaintiff's allegations
Plaintiff respectfully

requests that the Court deny Defendant's Motion for a
More Definite Statement.

22

URCP 56(c) .

Dated August 26 , 2002.

Alan B. Brown, M.D., J.D.
Attorney, acting for himself:
A l a n B. Brown, M.D., J . D .
2240 P a r l e y s T e r r a c e
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23

Morris v.

Farnsworth Motel,

259 P . 2 d 297

(Utah

1953).

